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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 16, 2010, approximately three million cable TV 
subscribers across the New York metropolitan area lost access to their local 
Fox stations and missed the first two games of the World Series.1 
Previously, on March 7, 2010, nearly 3.1 million households lost their local 
ABC signal and missed the first fourteen minutes of the Academy Awards.2 
In 2008, 1.5 million Time-Warner subscribers lost access to fifteen 
broadcast stations in fifteen local markets for one month.3 For nearly one 
month in 2007, seven hundred thousand Mediacom subscribers in twelve 
states lost access to twenty-three stations including affiliates of Fox, ABC, 
NBC, CBS, and the CW.4 In 2005, seventy-five thousand cable subscribers 
in Missouri, Louisiana, and Texas lost access to their local Nexstar 
broadcast affiliates for nearly one year.5 Examples of these types of signal 
blackouts date back even further.6 
More recently, on February 18, 2011, Univision pulled its broadcast 
signal from 7,000 Rhode Island households for three months.7 In March 
2011, DISH Network consumers in seventeen markets lost their CBS, 
FOX, NBC, and CW signals for six days.8 In September 2011, LIN TV 
pulled eight broadcast signals from the Mediacom cable systems in Florida, 
Michigan, and Indiana causing blackouts for nearly 1.2 million subscribers 
that lasted nearly six weeks.9 Multiple other blackouts have occurred this 
year.10 Each of these blackouts was the result of failed negotiations 
between the cable or satellite provider and the broadcaster.11  
                                                                                                             
 1.  Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 2718, para. 15 (2011) [hereinafter NPRM]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  MICHAEL L. KATZ ET AL., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER HARM FROM THE 
CURRENT RETRANSMISSION CONSENT REGIME 44 tbl.6 (2009), http://97.74.209.146/down 
loads/analysis_consumer_harm.pdf. 
 4.  Id. at 43 tbl.6. 
 5.  Id. at 42 tbl.6. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Deborah D. McAdams, Full Channel Cuts Deal with Univision to Replace WUNI-
TV, TVTECHNOLOGY (May 16, 2011, 2:50 PM), http://www.televisionbroadcast. 
com/article/120480. 
 8.  See Comments of The United States Telecom Ass’n at Exhibit 1, Amendment of 
the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. 
May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Telecom Comments]. 
 9.  LIN Pulls Stations from Mediacom, TVTECHNOLOGY (Sept. 1, 2011 10:15 AM), 
http://www.tvtechnology.com/article/123970; Merrill Knox, LIN Stations Restored for 
Mediacom Subscribers, TVSPY (Oct. 17, 2011, 10:26 AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/ 
tvspy/lin-stations-restored-for-mediacom-subscribers_b25517. 
 10.  See, e.g., Telecom Comments, supra note 8, at Exhibit 1. 
 11.  NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 15. 
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Under the current regulatory scheme, broadcasters and cable 
providers must enter into negotiations with each other for permission to 
retransmit a broadcast signal over a cable system.12 The vast majority of 
these retransmission consent negotiations are resolved privately, without 
government intervention and without the loss of broadcast signals to cable 
subscribers.13 However, sometimes the negotiations reach an impasse, and 
the result can be signal blackouts for cable subscribers. When this happens, 
consumers are inevitably harmed. 
Recently, there has been a growing dispute between cable providers 
and broadcasters about how to deal with such breakdowns in negotiations. 
While cable providers call for reform of the retransmission consent 
regulations, broadcasters resist government intervention.14 Meanwhile, the 
FCC has recognized the problem facing consumers and recently initiated 
proceedings to try to solve it.15 This Note will examine the contours of the 
dispute between cable providers and broadcasters and discuss the possible 
solutions to this growing crisis. In Part II, a brief history of the 
retransmission consent regulations of the 1992 Cable Act is put forth as 
necessary background information.16 Part III of the Note addresses the 
positions that cable companies and broadcasters have taken in the dispute. 
Part IV will discuss possible solutions to the dispute. Finally, Part V will 
offer some recommendations and conclusions as to what the best solution 
may be. 
II. RETRANSMISSION CONSENT  
Originally, cable television existed to serve locations that could not 
receive broadcast signals.17 The cable company’s job was to take the signal 
from the airwaves and retransmit it to a subscriber’s household.18 Initially, 
the FCC maintained it had no authority over cable television because it was 
                                                                                                             
 12.  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 13.  NPRM, supra note 1, at 2769 (statement of Comm’r Meredith Attwell Baker). 
 14. See generally Petition for Rulemaking to Amend the Commission’s Rules 
Governing Retransmission Consent at 2, Petition for Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 10-71, 1 
(filed Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Petition]; Reply Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters 
at I, Exec. Summary, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission 
Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter NAB Comments]. 
 15.  See NRPM, supra note 1. 
16.  Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
1992 Act]. 
 17.  Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of the 
Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 99, 101 (1996). 
 18.  Id. at 104.  
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not a “broadcaster” covered under the 1934 Communications Act.19 But as 
cable systems added “distant” signals, broadcasters began to view cable as 
a viable alternative; and the FCC, to avoid disturbance of its broadcast 
regulation, decided to regulate cable as well.20  
In the mid-1960s, in order to protect local broadcasting, the FCC 
required cable companies to carry the local broadcast signal when the cable 
signal competed for audience with the broadcast signal.21 Noting the vast 
growth of the CATV industry (the equivalent of cable) and the value of 
broadcasting, the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable upheld these must-
carry rules as within the FCC’s authority.22 However, the Court restricted 
the authority to regulate cable to “that reasonably ancillary to the effective 
performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation 
of television broadcasting.”23  
In 1984, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to 
provide a national policy regarding cable television, effectively eliminating 
the “reasonably ancillary” standard required by Southwestern Cable and 
allowing for direct regulation.24 However, in 1985, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the must-carry rules as implemented “are fundamentally at odds with 
the First Amendment” and struck them down.25 The FCC scaled down the 
rules, but in 1987, the same court struck them down again.26 This set the 
stage for the next wave of regulation. 
In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act (“1992 Act”).27 Congress found that broadcast 
programming was the most popular programming on cable systems and 
that cable systems obtained great benefits from local broadcast signals, 
which had historically been obtained without the consent of the 
                                                                                                             
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id. at 105. 
 21.  See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to Adopt Rules and Regs. to Govern the 
Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV 
Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, paras. 85, 87 (1965); 
Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regs. to Govern the Grant of 
Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV Signals to 
Cmty. Antenna Sys., Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, paras. 48–49 (1966). 
 22.  United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 162, 178 (1968). 
 23.  Id. at 178. 
 24.  See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 25.  Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 26.  Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 27.  Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).  
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broadcaster.28 The system resulted in an effective subsidy of the 
development of cable systems by local broadcasters, which in turn resulted 
in a competitive imbalance between the two industries.29 To right this 
imbalance, Congress amended Section 325 of the Communications Act to 
enable each local commercial broadcast station to elect every three years 
whether to proceed under the revised must-carry requirements of Section 
534 or the new retransmission consent requirements of Section 325.30 
The policy of the 1992 Act was to “promote the availability to the 
public of a diversity of views and information” and “ensure that cable 
television operators do not have undue market power vis-a-vis video 
programmers and consumers.”31 The FCC and Congress have consistently 
maintained that there is an interest in protecting local broadcast stations 
because of the perceived special role that broadcast television plays in civic 
life.32 Together, must-carry and retransmission consent rights provide 
significant benefits for broadcasters by ensuring they can obtain carriage 
and continue to provide important local programming to viewers.33 
Imposing modified must-carry rules, the 1992 Act requires each cable 
operator to carry the signals of local commercial broadcast television 
stations.34 The must-carry rules were enacted out of the concern that 
without intervention, cable’s dominance in the market could result in local 
broadcasting being blacked out.35 The 1992 Act’s version of the must-carry 
rules was upheld as consistent with the First Amendment by the Supreme 
Court in Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC in 1997.36 In the early years 
after the adoption of the Act, most broadcasters selected must-carry status, 
but by 2009, only 37 percent of stations relied on must-carry.37 
The second option available for broadcasters under the 1992 Act is 
retransmission consent.38 Under Section 325(b), cable operators cannot 
retransmit a commercial broadcast signal without the station’s express 
                                                                                                             
 28.  Id. § 2(a)(19), 106 Stat. at 1462. 
 29.  Id. § 2(a)(19), 106 Stat. at 1462–63. 
 30. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
 31. § 521(a)(21)(b)(1), (5). 
 32.  Barbara S. Esbin et al., Retransmission Consent: A System in Need of Reform, 1032 
PLI/Pat 205, 213 (2011). 
 33. Id. at 214. 
 34. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(a). 
 35. Randolph J. May, Broadcast Retransmission Negotiations and Free Markets, 
PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS (Free State Foundation, Potomac, Md.), Oct. 18, 2010, 
at 2, http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/ Broadcast_Retransmission_Consent_ 
Negotiations _and_Free_Markets_101610.pdf. 
 36.  Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997). 
 37.  NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 5 n.13. 
 38.  See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b). 
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consent.39 Thus, a broadcaster who chooses retransmission consent over 
must-carry must negotiate with cable companies and other multichannel 
video programming distributors (“MVPDs”) for consent to retransmit its 
signal.40 Recognizing the benefits cable providers obtained from carrying 
broadcast signals, “Congress adopted its retransmission consent provisions 
to allow broadcasters to negotiate to receive compensation for the value of 
their signals.”41 Congress intended to establish a marketplace for 
retransmission rights, but did not intend to “dictate the outcome of the 
ensuing marketplace negotiations.”42 
Originally, Congress provided no substantive standards governing 
retransmission consent negotiations.43 However, in 1999, Congress adopted 
new regulations, which required broadcasters engaged in retransmission 
consent negotiations with MVPDs to negotiate in good faith.44 The FCC 
believed that “by imposing the good faith obligation, Congress intended 
that the Commission develop and enforce a process that ensures that 
broadcasters and MVPDs meet to negotiate retransmission consent and that 
such negotiations are conducted in an atmosphere of honesty, purpose and 
clarity of process.”45 However, this statute was not intended “to subject the 
retransmission consent negotiations to detailed substantive oversight by the 
Commission.”46 
Under Section 325(b)(1)(A), if a broadcaster and an MVPD are 
unable to reach an agreement, then the MVPD may not retransmit the 
broadcaster’s signal.47 Because the plain language of the statute says that a 
broadcaster’s signal cannot be retransmitted without consent, when 
negotiations between broadcasters and MVPDs break down, the lack of 
consent leads to a possible blackout of the broadcast signal.48 When 
retransmission consent is revoked as a result of failed negotiations, “the 
result is to leave consumers literally in the dark, a result hard to square with 
the Commission’s overall mission to protect the public interest.”49 
                                                                                                             
 39.  Id. § 325(b)(1)(a). 
 40.  See NPRM, supra note 1, at paras. 2–3. 
 41.  Id. at para. 4. 
 42.  Id. at para. 7 (quotation mark omitted).  
 43.  Id. at para. 8. 
 44.  Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C). 
 45.  Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, First 
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5445, para. 24 (2000) [hereinafter Good Faith Order]. 
 46.  Id. at para. 6. 
 47.  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A). 
 48.  Petition for Rulemaking to Amend the Comm’n’s Rules Governing Retransmission 
Consent, Petition for Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 10-71, 26–27 (filed Mar. 9, 2010) 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
 49.  Esbin, supra note 32, at 238. 
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III. THE CURRENT DISPUTE: WHAT EACH PARTY WANTS 
Since the 1992 Act, the marketplace has changed considerably. 
Historically, MVPDs compensated broadcasters for retransmission consent 
through in-kind compensation, but today, “broadcasters are increasingly 
seeking and receiving monetary compensation.”50 Additionally, in 1992, 
broadcasters often only had a single local cable provider that could 
retransmit their signal, but the rise of competitive video programming 
providers means that broadcasters now have more options.51 Consumers 
also have more options for receiving programming.52  
Partly as a result of these market changes, retransmission consent 
negotiations between broadcasters and MVPDs “have become more 
contentious and more public.”53 While the 1992 Act was intended to 
protect consumers by ensuring them cable access to their local TV stations, 
the retransmission consent issue has “morphed over the years into a fight 
between well-financed special interests to see who could best game the 
rules to their own advantage.”54 This section of the Note examines the 
positions of the major players in the dispute. 
A.  Cable Providers 
According to cable providers, the retransmission consent scheme is 
broken.55 In March 2010, fourteen cable companies, MVPDs, and interest 
groups filed a Petition for Rulemaking (“Petition”) arguing that the 
retransmission consent regulations are outdated and harming consumers.56 
They believe that the current rules, largely unchanged since 1992, “are ill-
suited to curb the negotiating tactics employed by broadcasters that place 
consumers in a no-win position.”57 “[B]roadcasters’ manipulation of the 
current regime,”58 along with consumer harm and changes in the media 
landscape, mean it is time to reconsider the retransmission regulations.59 
In 1992, Congress acted out of concern that cable companies were 
acting as monopolies that threatened the public interest benefits associated 
                                                                                                             
 50.  NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 2. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  These options include direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) providers, telephone 
providers that offer video programming, and the Internet. Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 47 (statement of Comm’r Michael J. Copps). 
 55.  See Petition, supra note 48, at 35. 
 56.  Id. at 1. 
 57.  Id. at 5. 
 58.  Id. at 7–8. 
 59.  Id. at 1. 
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with broadcasting.60 But today, the increased number of cable providers in 
the market means that it is the broadcasters that enjoy distribution options 
far beyond incumbent cable companies.61 Because of this, broadcasters 
have more “incentive and ability to hold up MVPDs for ever-higher 
retransmission fees,” 62 and can easily exploit their new-found bargaining 
leverage to harm consumers.63 While Congress originally expected 
broadcaster demands for compensation to be modest,64 the shift in 
negotiating power to broadcasters has resulted in considerably higher 
fees.65  
The problem is that negotiations between broadcasters and cable 
providers do not take place in a free market.66 “Rather, . . . negotiations 
occur in the context of a federal law and regulation overlay that mixes 
elements of private bargaining with forced-access and protectionist 
elements.”67 These artificial constraints result in cable providers being 
unable to freely negotiate in the bargaining process.68 Thus, cable providers 
are caught “between a rock and a hard place: pay spiraling carriage fees 
and raise consumer rates, or be forced by broadcasters to drop local 
signals.”69 In both situations, the consumer is harmed.   
Cable providers proposed that the FCC adopt solutions that will keep 
consumer costs low and eliminate a broadcaster’s incentive and ability to 
use signal blackouts as a negotiating tactic.70 They believe the current rules 
fail to give the FCC the tools to battle “unreasonable price demands and 
hold-up threats” by broadcasters.71 First, they propose that the FCC adopt a 
new dispute resolution framework, including “compulsory arbitration, an 
expert tribunal, or similar mechanisms.”72 To trigger such mechanisms, an 
                                                                                                             
 60.   Id. at 2. 
 61.   Id. at 4. 
 62.   Id. at 5. 
63.   Id. at 7 
 64.  Id. at 4. 
 65.  NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 13; see also Press Release, SNL Kagan, SNL Kagan 
Releases Broadcast Retransmission Fee Projections Through 2017 (May 25, 2011)(on file 
with Press Release Distribution, http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/8483711.pdf) 
(reporting one consulting firm’s estimate that retransmission fees could rise 28% this year, 
from $1.14 billion to $1.46 billion). 
 66.  Petition, supra note 48, at 7. 
 67.  May, supra note 35, at 2. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Petition, supra note 48, at 1. 
 70.  Id. at 5. 
 71.  Id. at 16. 
 72.  Id. at 32. 
Number 3] RETRANSMISSION CONSENT 625 
MVPD would merely need to show that negotiations had broken down.73 A 
showing of bad faith would not be required.74 Cable providers argue that 
the FCC’s authority to adopt such mechanisms stems from Section 303(r), 
which states that the FCC can make such regulations and prescribe 
restrictions and conditions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of Section 325, which includes establishing dispute resolution 
procedures.75 The FCC has ordered similar arbitration in the past.76 
Second, cable providers urge the FCC to adopt interim carriage. 
Where a cable provider shows a willingness to negotiate for continued 
carriage of a broadcast station, the broadcaster “should not be permitted to 
withhold retransmission consent while such negotiations are pending.”77 
Interim carriage should be provided for in two situations: 1) while 
broadcasters and MVPDs continue to negotiate a renewal agreement in 
good faith, and 2) while a dispute resolution proceeding is pending.78 
Similar, to the proposed dispute resolution mechanisms, interim carriage 
would be available on a simple showing that negotiations had broken down 
and would not require showing bad faith.79  
Interim carriage would eliminate “brinkmanship as a negotiating tool” 
and ensure “that negotiations produce reasonable and noncoercive rates.”80 
It also would prevent broadcasters from “undermining the government’s 
interest in localism by . . . withholding their signal from a substantial 
portion of the viewing public.”81 Cable providers argue that authority to 
adopt interim carriage stems from Section 325(b)(3)(A).82 When faced with 
practices adversely affecting basic cable rates, the FCC is justified in 
ordering interim carriage to protect consumers.83 
                                                                                                             
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See id. at 32–33. 
 75.  Id. at 33; 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2010). 
 76.  See General Motors Corp. & Hughes Elec. Corp., Transferors & The News Corp. 
Ltd., Transferee, for Auth. to Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 
F.C.C.R. 473, para. 222 (2004) [hereinafter News Corp. Order] (requiring News Corp. to 
submit to binding arbitration with DirecTV or any other requesting MVPD and establishing 
rules for such arbitration). 
 77.  Good Faith Order, supra note 45, at para. 59. 
 78.  Petition, supra note 48, at 36. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 37. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(A) (2010). Providers point to the statute’s mandate that 
the FCC “establish regulations to govern the exercise by television broadcast stations of the 
right to grant retransmission consent.” Id. 
 83.  Petition, supra note 48, at 38. 
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Blackouts and related broadcaster tactics increase pressure on MVPDs 
to accept less than favorable offers.84 It is clear that “MVPDs today devote 
substantial time, money and energy to retransmission consent 
negotiations.”85 Also adding to the costs of retransmission consent 
negotiations is the fact that “[w]hen those negotiations break down . . . , 
they devote additional resources to managing the impact of that dispute on 
their subscribers and the marketplace.”86 The increasingly high costs to 
MVPDs of both the negotiation process and the final negotiated price are 
one reason cable providers strongly believe that government intervention is 
now necessary. 
B.  Broadcasters 
On the other hand, broadcasters, argue that the retransmission consent 
scheme is working as intended.87 They urge the FCC to resist MVPD 
requests to get involved.88 They believe that changes to the system are 
unnecessary, outside the FCC’s authority, and would be harmful to the 
public interest.89 As the National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”) 
puts it, “there is no legal, factual, or policy reason that broadcasters . . . 
should not be permitted to negotiate for compensation for the signals that 
MVPDs are reselling to their subscribers, or to be uniquely limited in the 
type or amount of compensation they may even request.”90 
The comments of the NAB are largely indicative of the industry’s 
opinion.91 NAB argues that when Congress adopted the 1992 Act, it did so 
                                                                                                             
 84.  STEVEN C. SALOP, ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BROADCASTERS’ BRINKMANSHIP 
AND BARGAINING ADVANTAGES IN RETRANSMISSION CONSENT NEGOTIATIONS 28 (2010), 
www.americantelevisionalliance.org/downloads/Broadcaster_brinkmanship.pdf [hereinafter 
BRINKMANSHIP STUDY]. 
 85.  Comments of Cablevision Sys. Corp. at 11, Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules 
Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 26, 2011) 
[hereinafter Cablevision Comments]. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 14. 
 88.  See Reply Comments of Nat’l Ass’n of Brdcsters at i, Amendment of the 
Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71, (rel. June 
27, 2011) [hereinafter NAB Comments]. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 12. 
 91.  See generally Reply Comments of Tribune Brdcsting. Co., Amendment of the 
Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. June 
27, 2011) [hereinafter Tribune Comments]; Comments of McGraw-Hill Brdcsting. Co., 
Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket 
No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011) [hereinafter McGraw-Hill Comments]; Comments of 
AllBritton Comm., Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 
FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011); Comments of Comm. Corp. of Am. FCC 
MB Docket No. 10-71 (rel. May 27, 2011); Comments of Granite Brdcst. Corp, Amendment 
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to ensure that broadcasters were not required to subsidize the establishment 
of cable.92 Also, noting that a substantial portion of the fees MVPDs collect 
represents the value of broadcast signals, Congress gave broadcasters the 
ability to negotiate for compensation for that signal.93 Thus, the decision to 
enact the retransmission consent provisions was an attempt to fix a market 
imbalance and was grounded in notions of equity and fair competition 
between broadcasters and MVPDs.94 NAB argues those policy rationales of 
the 1992 Act remain equally compelling today.95 
While cable providers have two revenue streams, broadcasters have 
only one and yet face similar programming costs.96 Undeniably, 
broadcasters provide valuable content to pay television providers.97 
Broadcasters use retransmission consent fees to continue to deliver this 
high-quality content to viewers by covering the high costs of producing 
local news.98 The fees also enable them to produce more and better local 
programming.99 Depriving broadcasters of retransmission fees would thus 
reduce the quantity and quality of content.100 Furthermore, without these 
fees, “[broadcast] stations could not compete on level terms with MVPDs 
for viewers and advertising revenues.”101 While fees have increased in 
recent years,102 the higher price broadcasters demand today merely reflects 
a “market correction.”103 
NAB argues that the FCC has correctly concluded that it lacks the 
authority to mandate interim carriage or binding dispute resolution.104 
Section 325(b)(3)(A) provides no authority for the FCC to adopt changes 
that would “override the clear congressional intent to establish a free 
marketplace in which broadcasters could negotiate compensation” and 
cannot “‘trump’ the absolute retransmission consent right in Section 
                                                                                                             
of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, FCC MB Docket No. 10-71 
(rel. May 27, 2011). 
 92.  NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 4. 
 93.  Id. at 5–6. 
 94.  Id. at 4, 6. 
 95.  Id. at 4. 
 96.  NPRM, supra note 1, at 2763 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski). 
 97.  Id.; see also McGraw-Hill Comments, supra note 91, at 1. The comments note that 
“[l]ocal broadcasters consistently and overwhelmingly deliver the most popular 
programming available on any MVPD’s platform.” Id. at 2.  
 98.  NAB Comments, supra note 88, at i. 
 99.  Id. at 7. 
 100.  Id. at 10. 
 101.  See id. at 6. 
 102.  McGraw-Hill Comments, supra note 91, at 2. 
 103.  NPRM, supra note 1, at para 14. 
 104.  NAB Comments, supra note 88, at 24. 
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325(b)(1).”105 Even if the FCC did have such authority, it should not 
micromanage retransmission consent negotiations106 because government 
intervention, or even an indication of government intervention, would slow 
down negotiations.107 
NAB believes that adoption of many of the MVPD proposals would 
“effectively amount to a government takeover of the substance of 
retransmission consent negotiations.”108 Instead, NAB argues that “the 
FCC should focus on revising its notice rules . . . to ensure that consumers 
have adequate information to make informed decisions in the event of a 
rare retransmission consent impasse.”109 With adequate notice, a subscriber 
can take action to protect access to programming it deems “must-have.”110 
This is the only proposed solution that will “directly impact and benefit 
consumers.”111  
Additionally, NAB denies that broadcasters have increased leverage 
due to increased MVPD competition,112 that retransmission prices are “too 
high,”113 and that “retransmission consent fees raise costs to 
consumers.”114 Furthermore, service disruptions occur in only a handful of 
instances, while thousands of agreements are reached uneventfully.115 As 
such, the position of broadcasters is overwhelmingly to resist government 
intervention in negotiations.116 Interference in the retransmission 
marketplace would “undermine [the] system of free, local television 
broadcasting that has served the American public so effectively.”117 
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C.  Consumers 
One consumer affected by the Academy Awards blackout is quoted as 
writing: “[c]onsidering what I pay for cable . . . and the fact that if I didn’t 
have cable, ABC would be free, I am having a hard time understanding the 
issue.”118 Her concerns are echoed by many other consumers.119 
Consumers are the innocent bystanders when broadcasters and MVPDs fail 
to reach an agreement.120  
The primary harms facing consumers caught in the middle of a 
retransmission dispute are potential or actual signal blackouts, rising cable 
costs, and switching costs.121 During contentious retransmission consent 
disputes, consumers are faced with uncertainty about their ability to receive 
certain broadcast stations.122 Threatened blackouts “may lead to consumer 
uncertainty, anxiety, and anger.”123 Actual blackouts cause cable 
subscribers to lose access to desirable programming, especially when timed 
to coincide with popular viewing events.124  
One study predicts that total industry retransmission fees will increase 
from $1.14 billion in 2010 to $3.61 billion by 2017, causing average cable 
subscriber fees to more than double.125 Cable subscription prices rise 
because retransmission consent fees are typically structured as a per-
subscriber fee.126 Longer disputes or threatened disputes could cause 
consumers to switch their cable provider and incur switching costs.127 But, 
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early termination fees may cause them to be unwilling or unable to switch 
cable providers.128 In every situation the consumer incurs costs.  
Consumers generally take the side of the cable companies, arguing 
that their interests are being ignored. One group argues that the FCC 
“should not lose sight of the fact that the viewing public is the intended 
beneficiary of the system of must-carry and retransmission consent.”129 
After all, failure to protect consumers from actual or threatened blackouts 
is not in the public interest.130 Thus, consumer groups ask the FCC to 
resolve the dispute without using consumers as “pawns in the battles 
between giant cable, satellite, and telecommunications companies on the 
one hand and massive broadcasting conglomerates on the other.”131 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
While Congress did not intend the FCC to sit in judgment of the terms 
of every retransmission agreement,132 it is clearly time to address the 
problem. The FCC has already proposed some possible changes to the 
regulations that it believes might help resolve the issue. There are also two 
other proposed rule changes, suggested by parties other than the FCC, 
which are arguably outside the FCC’s authority and thus will necessarily 
require action by Congress to implement.133 This section of the Note 
discusses these two groups of proposed solutions.  
A.  FCC Proposals 
On March 3, 2011, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules 
Related to Retransmission Consent (“NPRM”) to assess whether the 
current retransmission consent regulations were working effectively.134 The 
FCC proposed, and requested comment on, four rule changes it believes 
will allow negotiations to proceed more smoothly.135 These proposed 
changes are: 1) providing more guidance on good faith requirements; 2) 
improving advance notice of possible service disruptions to consumers; 3) 
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extending to non-cable entities the prohibition on deleting or repositioning 
a station during “sweeps”; and 4) eliminating the network nonduplication 
and syndicated exclusivity rules.136 The FCC believes that under the 
current statutory framework, it has limited tools to respond to impasses.137 
Thus, the NPRM focuses only on those tools currently within the FCC’s 
authority.138  
 1. Improving Good Faith Standards 
To determine whether negotiations are conducted in good faith, the 
FCC established seven objective good faith negotiation standards. A 
violation of any of these seven negotiation standards constitutes a per se 
breach of good faith.139 The FCC then uses a totality of circumstances test 
to determine if good faith exists.140 There have been very few complaints 
filed alleging violations of the good faith rules, and only one finding that a 
party to a retransmission consent negotiation had negotiated in bad faith.141 
The FCC intended to provide broad standards, but generally left 
negotiations to the parties.142 
The FCC believes that additional per se good faith negotiation 
standards would increase certainty of what constitutes a failure to negotiate 
in good faith and would promote the successful completion of 
negotiations.143 As such, it seeks comment on additional per se 
standards,144 whether there are additional actions that might constitute 
rebuttable presumptions of bad faith,145 and whether the FCC should 
impose additional penalties for failure to negotiate in good faith.146 Finally, 
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the FCC seeks comment on revising the “‘totality of the circumstances’ 
standard,” keeping in mind that it “[did] not intend the totality of the 
circumstances test to serve as a “back door” inquiry into the substantive 
terms negotiated between the parties.”147 
Both sides of the dispute generally agree that modifying the existing 
good faith regulations would be helpful. Many parties suggest their own 
specific per se violations.148 Others put forth suggestions of what should 
not be a per se violation of good faith.149 While obviously all of the 
suggested violations or nonviolations could not be included within the 
regulations, it is clear that more guidance is necessary in the area of good 
faith requirements.  
 2. Revision of Notice Requirements 
Under Section 534(b)(9), a cable operator must provide notice to a 
local commercial TV station thirty days before deleting or repositioning the 
station.150 Notice must also be provided to the cable subscribers.151 The 
current notice requirements apply only to cable operators (not to other 
MVPDs) and are only required when service is actually disrupted.152 Only 
when the station both fails to give proper notice and the station is actually 
deleted is there a violation.153  
The FCC seeks comment on whether to revise the notice requirements 
so as to provide notice of a potential deletion and whether such notice 
should be given regardless of whether the station’s signal is ultimately 
deleted.154 Under the proposed approach, if the parties have not reached a 
new agreement prior to thirty days from the agreement’s expiration, notice 
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must be given to consumers.155 The FCC also seeks comment on whether 
such notice would help avoid station deletions; by what means such notice 
should be given; how to prevent notice from becoming so frequent that 
consumers discount the notice; and whether notice is required if parties 
agree to an extension pending further negotiations.156 
In the NPRM, the FCC noted that benefits to enhanced notice include 
“providing consumers with sufficient time to obtain access to particular 
broadcast stations by alternative means, and encouraging the successful 
completion of renewal retransmission consent agreements more than 30 
days before an existing agreement expires.”157 Lack of notice deprives 
consumers of the necessary information needed to make informed 
decisions.158 The point of advanced notice requirements is to protect the 
consumers who lose stations, not the broadcasters or MVPDs.159 
Broadcasters overwhelmingly support advanced notice requirements as 
their preferred solution in the current dispute.160 
However, notice might be unnecessarily costly and disruptive, 
especially when no disruption occurs.161 Some commenters think enhanced 
notice would result in “unnecessarily alarming consumers and public 
officials, making negotiations increasingly contentious, providing 
broadcasters and rival MVPDs with more time to encourage customers to 
switch MVPDs, and causing customers who do switch to bear the 
associated costs unnecessarily if the negotiations are resolved without 
service disruption.”162 Enhanced notice requirements might also “sow 
confusion and fear amongst consumers.”163 Additionally, notice of 
impending impasses can serve as a “further front in the retransmission 
consent war” if it is used primarily as an “ad hominem attack[]” on the 
other party.164 Cable providers generally oppose notice requirements, 
believing they would cause MVPDs to be more vulnerable to broadcaster 
demands.165 
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 3. Extending “Sweeps” Prohibition to Non-Cable MVPDs 
Currently, Section 534(b)(9) provides that there can be no deletion or 
repositioning of a station during a period in which major television ratings 
services measure the size of audiences of local TV stations (“sweeps”).166 
But there is some confusion as to whether a broadcaster can force a cable 
provider to delete the broadcaster’s signal when the retransmission 
agreement expires during sweeps.167 This sweeps prohibition is imposed on 
cable operators only, and nothing in the statute suggests that Congress 
intended to impose a reciprocal obligation on broadcasters.168 Prohibiting 
broadcasters from withholding retransmission consent during sweeps 
would be contrary to the requirement in Section 325(b) of express consent 
by the broadcaster.169  
The FCC notes existing confusion about the current sweeps rule and 
invites comment on whether to extend the sweeps rule to broadcasters and 
non-cable MVPDs (such as DBS providers).170 The FCC would extend the 
sweeps prohibition to non-cable MVPDs in order to “achieve regulatory 
parity between cable systems and other MVPDs.”171 However, the FCC 
doubts its authority to impose a sweeps limitation on broadcasters.172 The 
NPRM invites comments on this analysis. 
Cable providers suggest the rule should be either eliminated or 
applied in a more reciprocal manner.173 As one commenter puts it, 
“[c]hanges that may assist only some and not others, whether a broadcaster 
or a MVPD, will not serve the public interest.”174 The current rule does 
little to encourage market-based negotiations and instead places yet another 
burden on MVPDs.175 Assuming that MVPDs are already at a disadvantage 
in market negotiations, this gives broadcasters additional leverage.176  
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 4. Elimination of Network Nonduplication and Syndicated 
Exclusivity Rules 
Network nonduplication rules permit a broadcast station with 
exclusive rights to network programming to prohibit a cable system from 
carrying the programming as broadcast by any other station within a 
designated area.177 Syndicated exclusivity rules allow a station “within a 
specified geographic zone to prevent a cable system from carrying the same 
syndicated programming aired by another station.”178 Together, these 
“exclusivity rules” give broadcasters the ability to “prohibit a cable system 
from carrying another station with the same programing.”179  
The FCC seeks comment on whether eliminating the rules would 
“help to minimize regulatory intrusion in the market, thus better enabling 
free market negotiations.”180 It also seeks comment on whether the benefits 
of the rules are outweighed by the negative impact on retransmission 
consent negotiations, whether exclusivity should be left completely to the 
private market with no FCC enforcement mechanism, and whether the rules 
have a negative impact on localism.181 Alternatively, the FCC suggests 
changing the rules so that they only extend to television stations that have 
already granted retransmission consent and are actually carried on the cable 
system.182 
Broadcasters argue that the exclusivity rules should not be eliminated, 
citing that their purpose has historically always been to preserve 
localism.183 The rules are “essential to the health of local television stations 
and their ability to serve the public.”184 The rules also protect investments 
in programming, and its elimination would merely permit duplication of 
already existing programming.185 Furthermore, eliminating the rules might 
have little effect on retransmission consent negotiations because private 
exclusive contracts between the parties would still exist.186 Eliminating the 
rules will not give MVPDs more partners to negotiate with, but would 
rather raise the cost of enforcing the contractual right, which in turn would 
raise retransmission fees.187 
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Cable providers believe the FCC should eliminate the exclusivity 
rules and allow them to import distant signals when retransmission consent 
impasses occur.188 Even without exclusivity rules, MVPDs will prefer local 
broadcast stations over out-of-market stations.189 MVPDs will only turn to 
out-of-market stations when the price demanded by the broadcaster exceeds 
the value of its signal.190 Therefore, eliminating the exclusivity rules would 
ensure the local station gets the value from retransmission consent it 
deserves without demanding too high a price.191 This will not adversely 
affect localism because “local broadcasters would be incentivized to invest 
more in local programming in order to make the adjacent market affiliate’s 
[programming] a poor substitute.”192 Eliminating the exclusivity rules “will 
foster more market-based negotiations” and “will enable video providers to 
deliver must-have programming content to their subscribers.”193  
B.  Non-FCC Proposals 
In addition to the FCC’s proposals, which have yet to be acted upon, 
there are two other proposed solutions. Specifically, they are interim 
carriage and mandatory binding arbitration.194 While MVPDs pushing for 
these two solutions argue the FCC does indeed have the authority to 
implement them, the FCC itself regularly denies such authority.195 Thus, 
any implementation of these two proposals will require action by Congress. 
This section of the Note discusses these two additional proposals and 
examines whether the FCC has the necessary authority to implement them.  
 1. Interim Carriage 
Currently, once the retransmission agreement between a broadcaster 
and cable provider expires, the broadcaster can immediately pull the 
signal.196 Harm is immediate—consumers lose stations, broadcasters suffer 
from declines in ratings and advertising revenue,197 and cable providers 
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lose their ability to compete effectively on price.198 Interim carriage would 
override the requirement of express consent of the broadcaster in 
retransmitting the signal and would require the signal to be kept on the 
cable system after the agreement expires. 
In the Petition, cable providers argue that interim carriage is a fitting 
solution to the retransmission consent dispute, as it will “curb broadcaster 
misconduct under the current system.”199 They believe that interim carriage 
“would serve the essential function of maintaining the status quo,”200 as 
well as help achieve the dual goals of eliminating broadcaster 
brinkmanship and fulfilling the government’s interest in localism.201 
Interim carriage would “promote an environment in which good faith 
negotiations between parties could occur.”202 More importantly, interim 
carriage would protect consumers from the loss of valued broadcast 
stations while providers work out the details of their agreements,203 and 
would preserve the public interest.204 
Broadcasters oppose interim carriage.205 They believe that when 
government intervention is imminent, MVPDs have no incentive to 
compromise or to avoid delay.206 As one commenter put it, “[i]f MVPDs 
can invoke federal power to compel carriage, they will have very little 
incentive to negotiate for carriage.”207 Broadcasters also argue that 
decisions to withhold retransmission consent are consistent with their 
public interest obligations, and therefore, interim carriage cannot be 
imposed on the basis of such obligations.208  
 2. Mandatory Binding Arbitration 
The second proposed solution would require parties to submit to 
mandatory arbitration whenever an impasse occurs in the retransmission 
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consent negotiation. Arbitration would be necessary once it was shown that 
“negotiations had broken down and that the parties could not agree on price 
or other terms and conditions of carriage.”209 The proponents of this 
solution argue that no showing of bad faith should be required to trigger 
dispute resolution proceedings.210 
Cable providers argue that mandatory binding arbitration would serve 
the same purposes as interim carriage, namely tackling rising 
retransmission rates and broadcaster brinkmanship.211 Mandatory binding 
arbitration is one way to address the abuse of market power that 
“animate[s] many retransmission consent negotiations today.”212 
Additionally, the FCC has at least once before ordered mandatory binding 
arbitration and provided procedures for a remedy.213 Although that dispute 
involved consent to transfer control, not retransmission consent, it signals 
that such procedures are at least feasible. Without mandatory binding 
arbitration or interim carriage, the FCC’s only enforcement mechanism is 
the “imposition of forfeiture penalties.”214  
Broadcasters oppose mandatory binding arbitration as they do interim 
carriage. They believe that encouraging parties to wait for the conclusions 
of a third party will result in more blackouts.215 This is because bringing a 
third party into the negotiation would likely introduce more delays216 and 
create incentives for MVPDs to refuse to come to reach agreements.217 
Furthermore, mediation would pit the parties as adversaries rather than 
focusing their efforts on reaching an agreement.218 While mediation should 
still be available to those parties who choose it, it should not be required, as 
it “introduces far more risk of delay and doubt than likelihood of 
success.”219 Rather, “the FCC should defer to the parties to choose their 
own forum and procedures for handling retransmission consent 
negotiations and disputes.”220 
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 3. Does the FCC Have the Necessary Authority? 
Those advocating for interim carriage and mandatory binding 
arbitration insist the FCC can derive such authority from Section 325 or 
Section 303(r) of the Communications Act.221 However, and much more 
importantly, the FCC doubts its own authority to enact rule changes outside 
the four proposed in the NPRM.222 Quite often throughout the NPRM, the 
FCC asserts that it does not have the power to enact certain regulations.223 
Chairman Genachowski explicitly states that the FCC does not have the 
authority to adopt interim carriage mechanisms or mandatory binding 
dispute resolution procedures.224 
While the FCC recognizes that interim carriage might best protect 
consumers, it concludes that the statute does not authorize such a 
mandate.225 The plain language of the statute prohibits retransmission 
without the broadcaster’s express consent, and the legislative history 
indicates that Section 325(b) was not intended to dictate the outcome of 
any negotiations.226 Therefore, the FCC’s interpretation of Section 325(b) 
prevents it from ordering carriage over the objection of the broadcaster, 
even if the requirement of good faith has been violated.227 The FCC sees no 
authority “to adopt regulations permitting retransmission during good faith 
negotiation.”228 The FCC also believes ordering mandatory binding 
arbitration would be inconsistent with Section 325, which opts for 
retransmission consent negotiations to be handled by private parties, and 
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which only authorizes an 
agency to use arbitration when all parties consent.229  
Whatever one’s personal opinions about the power of the FCC to 
enact these two proposals, it is clear that so long as it denies its own power 
to do so, the FCC will be very unlikely to enact such. Therefore, if interim 
carriage and mandatory binding arbitration are desirable solutions, it will 
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require statutory change by Congress.230 Congress must choose to 
“overhaul” the rules the FCC uses to address retransmission negotiations, 
and the FCC can “react accordingly.”231 
At least one Senator, John Kerry (D-MA), has proposed a bill that 
makes “the [FCC] a mediator, but not arbitrator, of the disputes.”232 Frank 
Lautenberg (D-NJ) has also agreed to work on a legislative change to the 
rules.233 At the same time, however, other policymakers continue to urge 
the FCC to act upon the NPRM,234 possibly indicating that they either 
believe the FCC has more authority than it realizes, or that interim carriage 
and mandatory binding arbitration are not desirable solutions. The current 
lack of consensus by Congress to inquire into their own role in the 
retransmission consent problem further complicates the issue of what the 
proper solution is. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
While the NPRM is pending, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski has 
cautioned that the proceeding is not a signal or excuse for parties to “drag 
their feet on reaching retransmission consent agreements.”235 
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell cautioned that negotiating parties 
should not use the NPRM as an excuse to stop negotiating and that nobody 
should assume the FCC will act in a particular way.236 However, the recent 
blackouts show that without immediate action, these cautions are falling on 
deaf ears. The FCC has consistently emphasized its commitment to the 
public interest, but signal blackouts are clearly harming the public interest. 
The time for inaction is over, and something must be done. 
In the majority of retransmission consent negotiations, an agreement 
is reached peaceably. In these negotiations, the current rules are working as 
intended. It is only the highly contentious disputes—the ones that lead to 
threatened or actual blackouts—that require government intervention. The 
changes adopted must then serve two primary purposes: to clarify the role 
of the negotiating parties in a retransmission consent negotiation; and to 
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prevent signal blackouts. Clarifying the parties’ roles will ensure that 
negotiations that can be solved amicably remain so, as well as provide 
guidance for future negotiations to follow this peaceful pattern. It will also, 
to the extent possible, ensure that the negotiations take place primarily 
between private parties. Preventing signal blackouts will eliminate 
consumer harm caused by cable provider and broadcaster conduct. 
Some of the FCC proposals should be adopted. Current confusion 
regarding good faith237 makes it necessary that good faith standards are 
revised. The FCC should take into account good faith proposals of cable 
providers, broadcasters, and consumers, and then determine which of them 
will best promote the goals of “honesty, purpose and clarity of process.”238 
By revising the good faith standards, each party becomes more aware of its 
responsibilities in the negotiation, and agreements can be reached without 
the use of harmful bad faith tactics. 
The notice requirements should be expanded to reduce consumer 
confusion. Consumers deserve to know when they are about to be subjected 
to a signal blackout. This transparency of information will incentivize cable 
providers to reach new agreements before the expiration of their existing 
agreements. To ensure that this tool is not abused by broadcasters, the 
revised good faith requirements should emphasize that notice is not a 
weapon, and that the parties should be acting in good faith long before 
notice is necessary. Finally, the exclusivity rules should not be eliminated, 
because the interests of localism outweigh other interests implicated by this 
proposal. Since they arise out of contractual right, the elimination of the 
exclusivity rules will have minimal effect.239 Moreover, as discussed 
below, concerns of cable providers regarding the exclusivity rules will 
largely be alleviated by the imposition of interim carriage. 
These changes, which arguably favor broadcasters, must be 
counteracted by legislative action. As long as the foregoing solutions are 
the only ones available to the FCC, it is arguable that they further tip the 
balance in favor of broadcasters. To prevent this, the FCC needs to be able 
to order the drastic solutions of interim carriage and mandatory binding 
arbitration when negotiations become contentious. These two solutions will 
level the playing field and prevent cable providers from accepting 
unfavorable proposals.240 The two solutions are of the type that would not 
be adopted unless there were truly no amicable solution in the 
retransmission negotiation. These solutions—especially interim carriage—
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would eliminate blackouts and threatened blackouts, thus fulfilling the 
second purpose of the solutions.241 
For these two solutions to be adopted, Congress must legislate. 
Congress, in the way it finds most beneficial, must extend to the FCC the 
necessary authority to adopt interim carriage and mandatory binding 
arbitration. How it does so remains a question for the debate floor. But 
Congress needs to give the FCC the authority that the FCC believes it 
lacks. The FCC could then implement these two solutions to appease cable 
providers and hopefully solve otherwise irreconcilable negotiations. 
As this year’s retransmission negotiations come to a close, predictably 
with some ending peaceably and others ending in signal blackouts, the FCC 
and Congress remain poised to finally adopt changes to ensure the system 
of retransmission continues to run smoothly in the current marketplace and 
fulfills the goals of the system. A combination of proposals adopted from 
the NPRM, as well as legislative change providing for interim carriage and 
mandatory binding arbitration in extreme circumstances, may well be the 
best option to level the playing field and eliminate consumer harm.  
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